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O P I N I O N  
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
This case involves a dispute between the owner of four tracts of subsurface property 
in the Allegheny National Forest (“ANF”)—Duhring Resources Company—and the 
United States Forest Service—the department of government responsible for managing the 
surface estate of the ANF.  Duhring brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”), seeking damages for the Service’s tortious interference with its ability to exer-
cise its oil, gas, and mineral (“OGM”) rights.  In order to have a cause of action under the 
FTCA, Duhring’s action must be one that Pennsylvania would recognize against a private 
individual.  The District Court held that Pennsylvania does not recognize Duhring’s cause 
of action, and thus dismissed Duhring’s complaint for lack for jurisdiction.  Our reading of 
Pennsylvania case law in light of an intervening decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court leads us to vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
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I 
At the turn of the 19th century, all of the land which now comprises the ANF was 
privately owned.  That changed in 1911 when Congress passed the Weeks Act and author-
ized the federal government to begin purchasing land to designate as forest reservations.  
See Weeks Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61–435, 36 Stat. 961 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 515-
21).   But property isn’t always cheap, particularly subsurface property that is rich in natural 
resources.  So in Pennsylvania, long a hub for coal mining, the federal government only 
purchased tracts of surface estate, leaving almost all of the subsurface estate in private 
hands.   
Under Pennsylvania law, the subsurface estate is the “dominant estate.”  This means 
that the owner of a subsurface estate “has the right to go upon the surface in order to reach 
the estate below, ‘as might be necessary to operate his estate.’”  Belden & Blake Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 969 A.2d 528, 532 (Pa. 2009) (citing 
Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 598 (Pa. 1893)).  But this right to access 
the surface estate is not unqualified: the subsurface estate holder must show “due regard” 
to the rights of the surface estate holder.  Id. at 530.  And “due regard” has been interpreted 
to include, among other requirements, providing at least 60 days’ notice to the surface es-
tate holder before commencing drilling.  See United States v. Minard Run Oil Co., No. 90-
12, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9570 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1980) (Minard Run I).  This under-
standing was subsequently codified in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. 30 U.S.C. § 
226(o)(2) (requiring “that reasonable advance notice be furnished to the Secretary of Ag-
riculture at least 60 days prior to the commencement of surface disturbing activities”). 
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Thus, this framework envisions a “cooperative approach” to balancing the rights of 
surface and subsurface estate holders.  Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 
236, 244 (3d Cir. 2011) (Minard Run III).  “Under this framework,”  
[M]ineral rights owners who planned to conduct drilling operations would 
provide the Service with the required notice and the two parties would then 
negotiate the details of drilling operations, such as the location of wells or 
access roads, so as to prevent any unnecessary surface use.  At the end of this 
process, the Service would issue a Notice to Proceed (NTP) to the mineral 
rights owner, which acknowledged receipt of notice from the mineral rights 
owner and memorialized any agreements between the parties regarding drill-
ing operations. 
Id.   
Suits against the federal government are normally prohibited based on sovereign 
immunity.  See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign 
immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”).  Under the FTCA, 
however, “the United States has waived its sovereign immunity” for some tort claims.  Me-
rando v. United States, 517 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2008).  Specifically, the FTCA waives 
sovereign immunity for, and thus grants federal jurisdiction over, claims that are: 
[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, ... [3] for injury or loss 
of property, or personal injury or death [4] caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government [5] while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment, [6] under circumstances where 
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the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477 (1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)) (emphasis added).  This 
dispute concerns the sixth requirement under the FTCA.  In this case, the “place where the 
act or omission occurred” is Pennsylvania.  So we look to Pennsylvania law to determine 
whether the alleged cause of action would be recognized. 
Because this appeal comes to us from an order of the District Court dismissing the 
case, we accept the factual allegations made in Duhring’s complaint as true.  See Mortensen 
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).  Duhring is an oil and 
gas company organized under Pennsylvania law.  In the mid-2000’s, it acquired the OGM 
rights associated with four parcels of land in the ANF—Lots 7, 8 and 9 and Warrant 3672.    
As with all property in the ANF, the United States owned the surface estate above each of 
these parcels.  In 2007, Duhring sent the Service its “notice of intent to conduct OGM 
development operations” at these four parcels.  See SA 7-9.   
Upon receiving notices of intent to conduct drilling operations from Duhring, the 
Service failed to issue NTPs within the 60-day timeframe for all four tracts.  The Service 
informed Duhring that it could not commence drilling operations until it received an NTP 
and, “on multiple occasions, they and their subordinates threatened criminal prosecution” 
if it proceeded without one.  Compl. ¶ 23.  The Service is also alleged to have interfered 
with Duhring’s use of the roads and its right to use stone found at the plots, and to have 
failed to remove timber from the plots in accordance with the applicable laws and regula-
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tions.  These delays also prevented Duhring from fulfilling the terms of its lease by com-
pleting a certain number of wells on its plots.  Duhring sought to recover lost profits result-
ing from these actions to the tune of over $8.5 million.  After exhausting its administrative 
remedies, it filed this action in federal court under the FTCA.  It alleged seven counts of 
tortious interference with enjoyment of a servitude, six of which have been raised here on 
appeal. The gravamen of Duhring’s complaint is that, through the aforementioned actions, 
the Service tortiously interfered with Duhring’s ability to exercise its OGM rights.1  The 
Service moved to dismiss Duhring’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction, claiming, inter alia, 
that Pennsylvania would not recognize Duhring’s cause of action. 
The District Court granted the Service’s motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked 
jurisdiction over Duhring’s claims for two reasons: first, the claims cannot be brought un-
der the FTCA because Pennsylvania does not recognize the alleged cause of action; and 
second, Duhring’s claims are barred by Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine.  
                                              
1 Specifically, Duhring alleges the following counts.  Count One is Duhring’s most ex-
pansive claim.  It alleges $8,552,000 in damages caused by delays associated with the 
Service’s failure to issue NTPs within the 60-day timeframe, its threat of criminal prose-
cution, it’s blocking of Duhring’s use of the roads, and its interference with stone mining 
and timber removal.  See Compl. ¶ 8-48.  Duhring did not appeal the District Court’s dis-
missal of Count Two.  See Compl. ¶ 49-52.  In Count Three, Duhring alleges that a Ser-
vice truck blocked access to one of its wells, resulting in $148 in lost profits.  See Compl. 
¶ 53-56.  In Counts Four and Five, Duhring alleged that the Service refused to sell the 
timber at Lot 8 and Warrant 3672 at a reasonable price, and refused to allow Duhring to 
remove the timber from those lots, resulting in $61,189.80 in damages.  See Compl. ¶ 57-
61.  In Count Six, Duhring alleges that the Service blocked its access to the roads, citing a 
lack of valid road permits, resulting in $5,293.60 in damages.  See Compl. ¶ 62-65.  In 
Count Seven, Duhring alleges that the delays associated with Duhring’s access to Lot 9 
prohibited it from fulfilling the terms of its lease, which required it to drill seven wells 
before a certain date.  This caused damages of $150,000, which Duhring paid to extend 
its lease.  See Compl. ¶ 66-70. 
 7 
 
The Court held that “none of the cases on which Plaintiff relies demonstrate that 
Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for money damages sounding in tort where a 
surface owner delays access to—but does not destroy (or even damage)—a subsurface 
OGM estate.”  A 14.  In reaching this determination, the Court analyzed three cases: Belden 
& Blake, Chartiers, and Minard Run II.2  It concluded that those cases “involved only the 
grant or denial of injunctive relief and/or declaratory relief.”  A 15.  They do not “recognize 
what Plaintiff has styled as the tort of ‘unreasonable interference with enjoyment of servi-
tude,’ nor do they provide authority for recovering money damages.”  Id.  Instead, the Court 
held that Duhring’s remedies are limited to injunctive relief. See A 14.  
The District Court also held that Duhring’s claims are barred by Pennsylvania’s 
economic loss doctrine, which adopts “the general rule of law that economic losses may 
not be recovered in tort absent any physical injury or property damage.”  SA 17-19 (quoting 
Gen. Pub. Utilities v. Glass Kitchens of Lancaster, Inc., 542 A.2d 567, 570 (Pa. 1988)).  
Given that Duhring “does not allege any damage to its OGM resources,” the District Court 
reasoned, the doctrine bars Duhring from recovering from these purely economic losses.  
A 17.  
For the aforementioned reasons, the District Court granted the Service’s motion to 
dismiss.  Duhring then filed this timely appeal.  
                                              
2 Belden & Blake Corp. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 969 A.2d 
528 (Pa. 2009); Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597 (Pa. 1893); Minard Run 
Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 09-125, 2009 WL 4937785 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2009), 
aff’d, 670 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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II 
Duhring asserted federal subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C § 
1346(b).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review the District Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
de novo.  See Merando, 517 F.3d at 163-64. 
III 
Duhring urges that the District Court erred in dismissing its complaint in toto.  We 
agree, but we part ways with Duhring as to the extent of the Government’s liability under 
Pennsylvania law.   
The resolution of the issues before us requires us to interpret Pennsylvania state law.  
“When ascertaining Pennsylvania law, the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
are the authoritative source.”  Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  
But in the absence of a controlling decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we 
must predict how it would decide the question.  See Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 
910, 914 (3d Cir. 2018).  In doing so, we may look to “decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts, of federal courts interpreting that state’s law, and of other state supreme 
courts that have addressed the issue, as well as to analogous decisions, considered dicta, 
scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest 
court in the state would decide the issue at hand.”  Spence, 623 F.3d at 216-17 (citation 
omitted). 
The District Court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction over all of Duhring’s 
claims under the economic loss doctrine.  Whatever ambiguity surrounded the applicability 
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of the economic loss doctrine at the time the District Court issued its opinion has been 
removed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dittman v. UPMC, 196 
A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2018).  In Dittman, the Court held that the economic loss doctrine does not 
apply where, as here, “the plaintiff can establish the defendant’s breach of a legal duty 
arising under common law that is independent of any duty assumed pursuant to contract.”  
Id. at 1038.  Because Duhring alleges interference with a property right, not a contract, the 
economic loss doctrine does not bar its claim. 
The Court’s reasoning in Dittman aligns with its prior cases on the economic loss 
doctrine.  For example, in Excavation Techs., Inc. v. Columbia Gas Co. of Pa., the Court 
held that the economic loss doctrine provides that “no cause of action exists for negligence 
that results solely in economic damages unaccompanied by physical injury or property 
damage.”  985 A.2d 840, 841 n.3 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Adams v. Copper Beach Townhome 
Communities, L.P., 816 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Super. 2003)) (emphasis added).  Duhring’s 
claim, however, does not sound in negligence.  Moreover, applying the economic loss doc-
trine to Duhring’s claim would conflict with cases allowing such claims without a showing 
of any damages.  See Jones v. Wagner, 624 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. Sup. 1993) (“We emphasize 
that Pennsylvania law requires no showing of physical harm or damage to the land before 
a possessor of land can enforce his right to freely enjoy unencumbered and exclusive use 
of property he rightfully possesses.”); see also 39 Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia § 501 
(“Any violation of the rights of the owner of an easement is actionable, whether any actual 
damage has resulted therefrom.”).  In short, the economic loss doctrine does not bar 
Duhring’s claim. 
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 The District Court held that Pennsylvania does not recognize a claim for money 
damages sounding in tort for the delay caused here.  That conclusion is incorrect.  Penn-
sylvania law does recognize the tort of interference with a servitude.  That Duhring alleges 
this tort in the split-estate context does not affect the availability of this claim.  And, as we 
discuss below, money damages are recoverable.  However, we predict that the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court would limit the Service’s liability for this tort to loss in rental value of 
the servitude, and would not permit recovery of lost profits. 
Duhring’s property interest in accessing the surface estate is best described as an 
easement.  In Belden & Blake, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the petitioners’ 
assertion that it, as a subsurface estate holder, had an “implied easement with a right to 
enter the [surface estate].”  969 A.2d at 529.  Likewise, Pennsylvania’s lower courts also 
refer to this property interest as an easement.  See, e.g., Babcock Lumber Co. v. Faust, 39 
A.2d 298, 303 (Pa. Super. 1944) (“The reserved mining rights imposed upon the surface 
an easement or servitude appurtenant to the dominant mineral estate which remained in the 
grantors after the conveyance.”) (emphasis added).  And the Weeks Act, which authorized 
the federal government to purchase the land comprising the ANF, also refers to the rights 
of subsurface estate holders vis-à-vis the surface estate as “rights of way, easements, and 
reservations retained by the owner from whom the United States receives title ….”  16 
U.S.C. § 518 (emphasis added).  See also Minard Run I, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *12 
(describing the subsurface estate holder’s property interest as a “pecurliar type of ease-
ment”). 
 11 
 
Given that Duhring has an easement, i.e., a type of servitude, over the surface estate, 
Pennsylvania law clearly recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with that 
property interest.  See Schmoele v. Betz, 61 A. 525, 527 (Pa. 1905) (recognizing a suit in 
equity regarding interference with an easement); Mershon v. Walker, 64 A. 403, 405 (Pa. 
1906) (same); see also 39 Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia § 502 (“The owner of an ease-
ment, upon interference with the easement by the owner of the servient estate, may proceed 
by action at law for damages.”).  And because Pennsylvania recognizes this cause of action, 
the District Court has jurisdiction over Duhring’s claim under the FTCA, unless an excep-
tion to the FTCA applies. 
We note that the parties raised before the District Court and briefed on appeal 
whether the discretionary function exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
applies in this case.  While the District Court did not reach this issue given its previous 
disposition, whether the discretionary function exception applies goes to the Court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and thus is potentially dispositive.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Me-
rando, 517 F.3d at 174-75.  Having considered the parties’ arguments as to whether the 
exception applies or the Forest Service’s alleged conduct was ultra vires, we conclude that 
this is a matter appropriate for resolution by the District Court.  The Government cites 
various statutes and regulations that are potential sources of authority for its alleged con-
duct.  See Gov’t Supp. Br. 3-5 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 537; 36 C.F.R. § 261.54(c) (road use 
permits); 30 U.S.C. § 226(o)(4); 16 U.S.C. § 472a; 36 C.F.R. § 261.6 (timber removal); 16 
U.S.C. § 559 (arrests)).  However, both ascertaining the scope of the Forest Service’s au-
 12 
 
thority created by those sources and deciphering the causation issues created by their inter-
action with the rights of subsurface owners that this Court recognized in Minard Run Oil 
Co. v. Forest Service, 670 F.3d 236, 254 (3d Cir. 2011) (Minard III), may well entail further 
fact-finding, including expert testimony as to the Forest Service’s actual policies and prac-
tices.  We leave it to the District Court to consider these issues in the first instance. 
If the discretionary function exceptions does not apply, then even though Duhring’s 
claim is actionable under Pennsylvania law, the question remains as to the proper measure 
of damages.  While the relief available is not limited to an injunction, based on the available 
authorities under Pennsylvania law we predict that damages for this claim are limited to 
the loss in rental value of the property interest. 
We turn first to cases from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involving interference 
with a servitude.  In Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., the Court held, “if the injury caused a 
total or partial loss of the land for a limited time, the diminution in rental value is the 
measure [of damages].”  62 A. 854, 855 (Pa. Super Ct. 1906).  This rule is reflected in the 
decisions of the Pennsylvania lower courts as well.  See Deeb v. Ferris, 28 A.2d 355, 356 
(Pa. Super. 1942) (“[A]ny damages awarded the plaintiff [will] be confined to an amount 
necessary to connect the sewer and to loss of rent.”).  Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Law 
Encyclopedia provides that an easement holder may “recover for the loss of use and the 
cost of restoring the easement to its former condition.”  39 Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia 
§ 502. 
Duhring argues that damages are available for its lost profits, citing Hillsdale Coal 
& Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 78 A. 28 (Pa. 1910), and Esgro v. Gibbons, 82 A.2d 
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318 (Pa. Super. 1951).  Although both cases involved awards of lost profits, they offer 
questionable guidance for this case.  In Hillsdale, the Court noted that two sources provide 
for damages: a statute providing for treble damages and an Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion rule that specifically provided for lost profits.  See 78 A. at 30.  We have no such basis 
for lost profits here.  And in Esgro, the plaintiff was awarded lost profits by a jury, but the 
evidence of lost profits and submission of that issue to the jury was never contested, or 
ruled upon, at trial.  See Esgro, 82 A.2d at 319-20.  So there is actually no Pennsylvania 
case law that holds that any damages other than for loss of rental or use value are available 
for interference with an easement.  Accordingly, we hold that the proper measure of dam-
ages for Duhring’s claim is the loss of rental value of the servitude.   
IV 
Duhring claims damages, for the most part, in the nature of profits lost as a result of 
the interference with Duhring’s access to its easement.  We have held such profits to not 
be recoverable.  While Duhring did not assert a claim for lost rental value, we will allow it 
to seek those damages on remand.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
